




◄ --II. FINNISH INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 
NOVEMBER 2020 120 
UZBEKISTAN’S NEW CENTRAL ASIA
POLICY 
THE ECONOMIC RATIONALE AND POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS
OF GOOD NEIGHBOURLINESS 
Kristiina Silvan 
The Finnish Institute of International Affairs is an independent research institute that produces 
high-level research to support political decision-making as well as scientific and public debate 
both nationally and internationally.
All manuscripts are reviewed by at least two other experts in the field to ensure the high
quality of the publications. In addition, publications undergo professional language checking 














FIIA WORKING PAPER 
C --II. FINNISH INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 
Arkadiankatu 23 b 
POB 425 / 00101 Helsinki 
Telephone +358 [0)9 432 7000 
Fax +358 10)9 432 7799 
www.fiia.fi 
I NOVEMBER 2020  120 
UZBEKISTAN’S NEW CENTRAL ASIA POLICY 
THE ECONOMIC RATIONALE AND POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF GOOD NEIGHBOURLINESS 
Under the leadership of President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, Uzbekistan has embarked on a
moderate reform programme that aims to achieve socio-economic growth without undo-
ing the country’s authoritarian political system. Te programme has implications beyond
Uzbekistan’s borders because it has changed the way Uzbekistani foreign policy is for-
mulated and implemented. Uzbekistan’s former isolationist stance has shifted to a for-
eign policy opening, which is most noticeable in the improvement of its relations with its 
neighbours. 
Tis Working Paper analyzes “good neighbourliness”, the key concept of Uzbekistan’s
new Central Asia policy. It details the amendment of Uzbekistan’s bilateral relations with
its neighbours and points to the positive reception of Uzbekistan’s new regional policy
in Russia, China, and the West. Te paper argues that while “good neighbourliness” is a
pragmatic strategy rooted in economic rationality, the policy’s regional implications are
substantial. It is laying the necessary foundation for sustainable Central Asian co-operation




Te EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood and Russia,
Finnish Institute of international Afairs 
ISBN 978-951-769-663-0 
ISSN 2242-0444 




      
       
 
 




FIIA WORKING PAPER I 
CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION 4 
“GOOD NEIGHBOURLINESS” IN CENTRAL ASIA:
IMPLICATIONS OF UZBEKISTAN’S GOOD 
THE NEIGHBOURS BEYOND:
ECONOMIC RATIONALE FOR THE GOOD NEIGHBOURLINESS POLICY 5 
FROM WORDS TO DEEDS, ON BILATERAL TERMS 6 
NEIGHBOURLINESS FOR CENTRAL ASIA 9 
UZBEKISTAN BETWEEN THE BIG NON-REGIONAL ACTORS 10
CONCLUSIONS 11 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 13 
NOVEMBER 2020   3 














































FIIA WORKING PAP ER I 
UZBEKISTAN’S NEW CENTRAL ASIA POLICY 
THE ECONOMIC RATIONALE AND POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF GOOD NEIGHBOURLINESS 
INTRODUCTION 
Following the death of the long-serving President Is-
lam Karimov in 2016, Uzbekistan’s foreign policy has
been in fux. Shavkat Mirziyoyev, who followed Ka-
rimov to the presidency in a smooth succession after
serving thirteen years as prime minister, has sought
to change the isolationism of his predecessor to a new 
foreign policy opening. Te changes have been par-
ticularly noticeable in Uzbekistan’s relations with its
immediate neighbours in Central Asia. By advancing a
pragmatic policy of “good neighbourliness”, an exten-
sion to Mirziyoyev’s wider policy agenda of authoritar-
ian modernization, Tashkent has been able not only to
simplify its everyday encounters with its neighbours,
but also to improve its public image in the interna-
tional arena without causing resentment among the
big non-regional actors. 
Uzbekistan is the Central Asian region’s most pop-
ulous country, and the only one that shares borders
with all others. Te country has signifcant potential
for industrial development due to its past as a tech-
nological research hub, the prominence of natural re-
sources (primarily minerals and gas), and a large and
young labour force. Tese structural factors make Uz-
bekistan’s development in the 21st century pivotal for
the Central Asian region and beyond. As this Working 
Paper details, “good neighbourliness” has been exer-
cised by the establishment of regular and predomi-
nately benevolent communication between Mirziyoyev
and the heads of state of Uzbekistan’s fve immediate
neighbours, the demarcation and opening of closed
and contested borders with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan,
and the promotion of regional trade and transport net-
works across the region. 
Authoritarian modernization, as defned by Vladimir
Gel’man and Andrey Starodubtsev and applied by Luca
Anceschi in his study of Mirziyoyev’s Uzbekistan, is
“the achievement of socio-economic growth without
full-scale democratization”.1 Although the proclaimed 
aim of Mirziyoyev’s reform programme is to “modernize
and liberalize all spheres of life”,2 analysts agree that the
reforms do not seek to undo the current authoritarian
system of government but rather, as Anceschi puts it,
to “upgrade and update” it from its current “archaic”
version to the level of contemporary “sophisticated”
authoritarianism.3 Tis Working Paper uses these dis-
cussions as a starting point for analyzing Mirziyoyev’s
regional policy. Specifcally, it asks how Tashkent’s pol-
icy of “good neighbourliness” in Central Asia is geared
towards supporting Uzbekistan’s socio-economic de-
velopment and whether the policy has implications for 
the regional dynamics in Central Asia. Moreover, a brief
overview of the responses of major non-regional actors
– Russia, China, the US – as well as the EU takes stock
of the international efect of Uzbekistan’s new neigh-
bourhood policy. 
Teoretically, this  paper positions itself in the for-
eign policy analysis literature that stresses the impor-
tance of domestic politics for foreign policy behaviour.4
Drawing on the literature on authoritarian modern-
ization and authoritarian regionalism, it maintains
that Tashkent’s policy of “good neighbourliness” has
been pursued primarily in order to achieve economic
growth in Uzbekistan, which is in turn instrumental
in legitimizing Mirziyoyev’s rule. However, the policy 
can also be interpreted as the necessary frst step in ac-
celerating the endogenous regional integration within
Central Asia that has been suspended ever since the
Organisation of Central Asian Cooperation (TsAS) was
merged with the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Com-
munity (EvrAzES) in 2005.5
1 Vladimir Gel’man & Andrey Starodubtsev, “Opportunities and Constraints 
of Authoritarian Modernisation: Russian Policy Reforms in the 2000s,” Eu-
rope-Asia Studies 68, no. 1, (2016); Luca Anceschi, “Regime-Building through 
Controlled Opening. New Authoritarianism in Post-Karimov Uzbekistan,” in 
Monitoring Central Asia and the Caspian Area: Development Policies, Regional 
Trends, and Italian Interest, ed. Carlo Frappi & Fabio Indeo (Venezia: Edizioni Ca’ 
Foscari, 2019). 
2 “Tsel’ strategii” [“Aim of the Strategy”], Strategiya deistviy po pyati prioritet-
nym napravleniyam razvitiya Respubliki Uzbekistan v 2017-2020 godakh [Ac-
tion Strategy on the Five Priorities for the Development of the Republic of Uz-
bekistan in 2017-2020], http://strategy.gov.uz/ru (accessed 16 October 2020). 
3 Anceschi, “Regime-Building through Controlled Opening.” 
4 See e.g. Vendulka Kubalkova, “Introduction”, in Foreign Policy in a Constructed 
World, ed. Vendulka Kubalkova (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2001). 
5 Luca Anceschi, Analysing Kazakhstan’s Foreign Policy: Regime neo-Eurasian-
ism in the Nazarbaev era (New York: Routledge, 2020), 56-92. 






































































FIIA WORKING PAPER I 
ECONOMIC RATIONALE FOR THE GOOD
NEIGHBOURLINESS POLICY 
When Mirziyoyev came to power in 2016, Uzbekistan
was politically and economically isolated. Te gradual 
transition from planned economy to state-led capi-
talism in the early 1990s was a relative success: Uz-
bekistan was the frst Soviet successor state to regain
its pre-independence level of GDP, maintaining high
levels of economic growth throughout the 2000s be-
cause of the global resource boom.6 Yet, echoing the
resource curse, revenue generated by cotton, minerals,
and energy exports reduced the imperative to reform
the economy and contributed to the government’s
authoritarian resilience.7 For the general population,
the standard of living rose insignifcantly, and Uzbeki-
stan fell behind Kazakhstan in economic development.
Te Uzbek economy under Karimov, based on revenue
generated by capital-heavy state-owned enterprises,
was underperforming but not collapsing.8
Economic underperformance was not an issue
per se, but what made it problematic was that it was
at odds with Karimov’s Uzbekistan Vision 2030, 
which in 2012 set the goal of making Uzbekistan a
middle-income country in less than two decades.9
In practice, this could only be achieved by boosting
growth through the modernization of state-owned
enterprises and improving the climate for private and
foreign direct investment.10 As is typical of authori-
tarian regimes that derive their right to rule from the 
fulflment of societal needs and desires like material
welfare and personal security – dubbed “performance
legitimacy” by Peter Burnell,11 the programme tied the
Uzbek leadership’s legitimacy to its socioeconomic
performance. 
Mirziyoyev confrmed the regime’s commitment
to socioeconomic performance in his 2016 presidential
campaign by promising to double Uzbekistan’s GDP
by 2030 by introducing a cross-sectional programme
of modernization.12 Although the aspect of political
6 Richard Pomfret, Te Central Asian Economies in the Twenty-First Century: 
Paving a New Silk Road (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019), 95. 
7 Richard Auty, “Conclusions: Lessons not learned by the CCA countries?” in En-
ergy, Wealth and Governance in the Caucasus and Central Asia: Lessons Not 
Learned, ed. Richard Auty & Indra de Soysa (New York: Routledge, 2006). 
8 Pomfret, Te Central Asian Economies in the Twenty-First Century, 116. 
9 Ibid. 
10 U.S. Embassy in Tashkent, 2020 Investment Climate Statements: Uzbekistan. 
https://uz.usembassy.gov/2020-investment-climate-statements-uzbekistan/
(accessed 16 October 2020). 
11 Peter Burnell, “From Evaluating Democracy Assistance to Appraising Democracy 
Promotion,” Political Studies 56, no. 2, 2007. 
12 Catherine Putz, “What to Expect from Uzbekistan’s Presidential Election,” Te 
Diplomat, December 2, 2016, https://thediplomat.com/2016/12/what-to-ex-
pect-from-uzbekistans-presidential-election/ (accessed 1 October 2020). 
liberalization is included in the list of necessary re-
forms, tangible development in the sphere has been
limited to the pardoning of political prisoners and roll-
ing back on information censorship and suppression of
civil society.13 According to the OSCE’s electoral mon-
itoring mission, the 2019 parliamentary elections “did
not yet demonstrate genuine competition”,14 while
Freedom House grants Uzbekistan just two out of 40
points in the category of political rights.15 Terefore,
as many authors have argued by now, Mirziyoyev’s re-
forms should be seen as a case of authoritarian mod-
ernization that aims to achieve socio-economic growth
with minimal democratization. 
If authoritarian modernization is the goal of Mir-
ziyoyev and his associates, foreign policy is the major
vehicle for pursuing it.16 Furthermore, as this paper
suggests, Central Asia has a pivotal role in Uzbekistan’s
new foreign policy precisely because it is an area where
relatively minor changes can yield quick economic
gains: normalizing relations with one’s neighbours is
essential for trading efectively with the outside world
and improving Uzbekistan’s image internationally. In 
essence, Mirziyoyev’s policy of economic opening in
general, and the “good neighbourliness” in particular,
is based on an assumption that, at present, economic
and political isolation is doing the country – and his
rule – more harm than good.17 Te projection of Uz-
bekistan as a dynamic and open country is designed
to attract foreign direct investment, and the policy of
“good neighbourliness” aims at (re-)establishing an
interconnected and cooperative regional setting which
would be turned to Tashkent’s and the entire region’s 
economic advantage. In November 2017, Mirziyoyev
claimed that calculations conducted by UN experts
13 Edward Lemon, “As Uzbekistan Opens Up, the Goal Is Economic Mod-
ernization, not Liberalization,” World Politics Journal, October 25, 2018, 
https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/26585/as-uzbeki-
stan-opens-up-the-goal-is-economic-modernization-not-liberalization (ac-
cessed 5 October 2020); Jennifer Brick Murtazashvili & Bakhrom Mirakilov, “Te 
Paradox of Uzbekistan’s Budding Virtual Civic Space,” Te Diplomat, 20 August, 
2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/08/the-paradox-of-uzbekistans-bud-
ding-virtual-civic-space/ (accessed 2 October 2020). 
14 OSCE Ofce for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, Election Observa-
tion Mission Final Report of the Parliamentary Elections of 22 December 2019 in 
the Republic of Uzbekistan, 13 May, 2020, https://www.osce.org/fles/f/docu-
ments/9/3/452170_1.pdf, 1. 
15 Freedom House, “Uzbekistan,” Freedom in the World 2020, https://freedom-
house.org/country/uzbekistan/freedom-world/2020 (accessed 10 October 
2020). 
16 Luca Anceschi, “Mirziyoyev’s Foreign Policy: Globalizing Uzbekistan in the Asia 
Century,” Georgetown Journal of International Afairs, April 2, 2018, https:// 
www.georgetownjournalofnternationalafairs.org/online-edition/2019/4/1/ 
mirziyoyevs-foreign-policy-globalizing-uzbekistan-in-the-asian-century
(accessed 15 October 2020). 
17 Analyzing the change of Uzbek foreign policy from Karimov to Mirziyoyev 
illustrates the importance of agency for geoeconomic explanations. Although 
the geoeconomic potential of a strategically located region is structural, the ma-
terialization of fnancial potential does not happen on its own. On geoeconom-
ics, see e. g. Sören Scholvin & Mikael Wigell, “Geo-economic power politics: 
An introduction,” in Geo-economics and Power Politics in the 21st Century: 
Te Revival of Economic Statecraft, ed. Mikael Wigell, Sören Scholvin & Mika 
Aaltola (London and New York: Routledge, 2018). 
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FIIA WORKING PAP ER I 
suggested that “efective cooperation” within the re-
gion could at a minimum double Central Asia’s aggre-
gate GDP in just ten years.18 
In fact, the rationale for a good neighbour pol-
icy that has been actively pursued by Mirziyoyev
since 2016 was included in Karimov’s Foreign Policy 
Concept of 2012. It was then, in the aftermath of the
announced US withdrawal from Afghanistan, that
Central Asia was declared a foreign policy priority for
Uzbekistan.19 Until then, Aleksey Aseryan argues, the
presence of US troops had ensured a level of security 
and predictability in the region and thus alleviated
Uzbekistan’s concerns about the spread of destabi-
lization.20 
One of the reasons why “good neighbourliness”,
discussed in detail in the following section, has been
so successful up to now (and why the country’s neigh-
bours have welcomed it) is that it does not contradict
the two core principles of Uzbekistan’s foreign policy:
sovereignty and multilateralism. By opting to engage
frst and foremost on bilateral terms, Mirziyoyev has
continued asserting Uzbekistan’s independence from
the big non-regional actors.21 Although trade relations
with Russia have improved during Mirziyoyev’s ten-
ure, Uzbekistan has thus far rejected Moscow’s calls to
join the Eurasian Economic Union despite encourage-
ment from Russia. As for Uzbekistan’s biggest trading 
partner – China – Mirziyoyev has been motivated to
pursue closer collaboration in the framework of the
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), while seeking to avoid a
debt trap like neighbouring Turkmenistan, Tajikistan
and, to an increasing extent, Kyrgyzstan.22 
18 Shavkat Mirziyoyev, quoted in “Uzbekistan predlozhil stranam TsA razrabotat’ 
programmu razvitiya transporta” [“Uzbekistan invited Central Asian countries 
to draft a programme for transportation development”], Regnum, 10 November, 
2017, https://regnum.ru/news/polit/2343963.html (accessed 16 October 2020). 
19 Farkhod Tolipov, “Uzbekistan’s New Foreign Policy: No Base, No Blocs, But Na-
tional Interests First,” CACI Analyst, 5 September, 2012, http://www.caciana-
lyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/12557-analytical-articles- (ac-
cessed 13 October 2020). 
20 Aleksey Aseryan, “New Faces, Old Patterns in Uzbekistan’s Foreign Policy,” 
Te Diplomat, 21 August, 2019,  https://thediplomat.com/2019/08/new-fac-
es-old-patterns-in-uzbekistans-foreign-policy/ (accessed 16 October 2020). 
21 Te only regional organization that Uzbekistan has joined in recent years is the 
Turkic Council. Umida Hashimova explains the decision by noting that since the 
Council is founded on United Nations principles and norms, Uzbekistan’s sover-
eignty is not at stake. Umida Hashimova, “Uzbekistan Joins the Turkic Council,” 
Te Diplomat, 23 September, 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/09/uzbeki-
stan-joins-the-turkic-council/ (accessed 15 October 2020). 
22 Umida Hashimova, “Uzbekistan Increasingly Turns to China for Development 
Loans,” Eurasia Daily Monitor 16, no. 118, 4 September, 2019, https://james-
town.org/program/uzbekistan-increasingly-turns-to-china-for-develop-
ment-loans/ (accessed 16 October 2020). 
“GOOD NEIGHBOURLINESS” IN CENTRAL ASIA:
FROM WORDS TO DEEDS, ON BILATERAL TERMS 
In an interview shortly after his electoral victory, Mir-
ziyoyev elaborated on his vision of “good neighbourli-
ness” in the Central Asian context: 
One of the main directions of our country’s 
foreign policy is to strengthen ties with our
closest neighbours. This is a natural aspira-
tion, and it proceeds from a clear understand-
ing that the sustainable development of Uzbek-
istan largely depends on how correctly we can 
build our regional policy. We all understand
that Central Asia is a single organism. […] Is-
sues of concern to all residents of the region, no
country alone will be able to resolve, such as
the issues of border delimitation and demar-
cation, transport, ecology, the rational and
fair use of water resources. Returning to the
issues of regional cooperation, I would defne
the current policy of Uzbekistan as follows: not
to ignore thorny issues and to seek reasonable 
compromises.23 
Te slogans have since been turned into practical
deeds, with Kyrgyzstan being the first recipient of
this new-found goodwill. On his second day as in-
terim president, Mirziyoyev ordered Uzbek troops to
release four Kyrgyz nationals that had been detained
in Ungar-Too, a disputed hill on the Uzbek-Kyrgyz
border. Moreover, the decision was soon followed by
the launch of negotiations on the demarcation of the
disputed parts of the Uzbek-Kyrgyz border, which
resulted in the demarcation of 80% of the border by
September 2020.24
Although disputes between border communities
are still taking place, high-level diplomacy has been
applied to resolve conflicts more successfully than
in the past. For example, in May 2020, violence over
access to water broke out between villagers in the
Kyrgyz settlement of Chechme and the Uzbek en-
clave of Sokh. Te following day, Kyrgyz First Deputy
Prime Minister Kubatbek Boronov and Uzbek Prime
Minister Abdulla Aripov arrived at the locality, held
talks and pledged a joint investigation, while Presi-
dents Shavkat Mirziyoyev and Sooronbay Jeenbekov
23 Shavkat Mirziyoyev, quoted in Askar Muminov, “Pochemu i zachem Mirzoyoyev 
priyekhal v Astanu” [“Why and for what did Mirziyoyev come to Astana?”], 
Kazinform, 22 March, 2017, https://inbusiness.kz/ru/news/pohemy-i-za-
hem-Mirzieev-edet-v-Astany (accessed 16 October 2020). 
24 “Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan border dustup prompts rapid-reaction diplomacy”, 
Eurasianet, 1 June, 2020, https://eurasianet.org/uzbekistan-kyrgyzstan-bor-
der-dustup-prompts-rapid-reaction-diplomacy (accessed 16 October 2020). 
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promised “extensive measures” to prevent such a sit-
uation in the future.25 
In economic terms, Uzbekistan’s friendly stance
towards Kyrgyzstan is linked to the desire to alleviate
risks related to cross-border water management, dis-
cussed below, as well as to secure the operation of the 
transport corridor to China. While Uzbekistan is al-
ready connected to China by rail through Kazakhstan,
Uzbek ofcials claim that the route via Kyrgyzstan is
20% less expensive regardless of the fact that midway 
the cargo is still moved by trucks.26 Meanwhile, Uz-
bekistan’s exports to Kyrgyzstan have jumped from
$67 million in 2016 to $348 million in 2019. Although
ofcials point to the mutual benefts of the increased
bilateral trade, some have questioned the presum-
ably even gains of the growth in cross-border trade.
Zhamin Akimaliyev, a Kyrgyz former deputy and sen-
ior agricultural scientist argues that Uzbekistan takes
full advantage of the open borders and supports its
domestic producers’ exports to Kyrgyzstan in various
ways, causing problems for Kyrgyz farmers.27 
In March 2017, Mirziyoyev made his first foreign
trip to Turkmenistan as the elected president of Uzbek-
istan in a foreign policy move that was both symbolic
and practical. The result of the visit was the signing
of a raft of trade and transportation agreements, in-
cluding a bilateral Strategic Partnership Agreement.28
For Uzbekistan, functional relations with Ashgabat are
vital because a transit corridor through Turkmenistan 
ofers a crucial gateway to world ports and markets,
primarily through Iran. A year after the completion of 
the rail and road bridge across the Amu Darya River
in Turkmenistan, the volume of cargo transportation
increased significantly.29 Turkmenistan is interest-
25 Press service of the Presidential Administration of the Kyrgyz Republic, quot-
ed in “Sostoyalsya telefonnyi razgovor Sooronbaya Zheenbekova i Shavkata 
Mirziyoyeva” [“Tere was a telephone conversation between Sooronbay Jeen-
bekov and Shavkat Mirziyoyev”], Vesti.kg, 1 June, 2020, https://vesti.kg/poli-
tika/item/71953-sostoyalsya-telefonnyj-razgovor-sooronbaya-zheenbeko-
va-i-shavkata-mirzieeva.html (accessed 19 October 2020). 
26 Mikhail Dovlatov, “V Tashkente sostoyalos’ torzhestvennoye otkrytiye pilot-
nogo avtoprobega ‘Kitay-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan’,” Podrobno.uz, 30 October, 
2017, https://podrobno.uz/cat/economic/v-tashkente-sostoyalos-torzhestven-
noe-otkrytie-pilotnogo-avtoprobega-kitay-kyrgyzstan-uzbekistan/ (accessed 
19 October 2020). Te Kyrgyz segment of the railway is uncompleted and is likely 
remain so for years to come due to a lack of fnancing. Umida Hashimova, “Te 
China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan Transport Corridor Stretches Further Into Chi-
na,” Te Diplomat, June 22, 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/06/the-chi-
na-kyrgyzstan-uzbekistan-transport-corridor-stretches-further-into-china/
(accessed 19 October 2020). 
27 Zhamin Akimaliyev, quoted in Ernist Nurmatov, “Tovarooborot: Kyrgyzstan 
proigryvayet Uzbekistanu?” [“Trade turnover: Is Kyrgyzstan losing to Uzbek-
istan?”], Radio Azattyk, 4 February, 2019, http://uzxalqharakati.com/ru/ar-
chives/24324 (accessed 19 October 2020). 
28 Umida Hashimova, “Energy, Transportation Dominate Turkmenistan President’s 
Visit to Tashkent”, Eurasia Daily Monitor 15, no. 66, 1 May, 2018 https://james-
town.org/program/energy-transportation-dominate-turkmenistan-presi-
dents-visit-to-tashkent/ (accessed 19 October 2020). 
29 Zilola Karimova, “Connecting Asia: Uzbekistan Looks to Capitalize on Central 
Asia’s Transport Potential”, Te Diplomat, 12 April, 2018, https://thediplo-
mat.com/2018/04/connecting-asia-uzbekistan-looks-to-capitalize-on-cen-
tral-asias-transport-potential/ (accessed 19 October 2020). 
ed in involving Uzbekistan in the construction of the
problematic TAPI project, a natural gas pipeline link-
ing Turkmenistan’s Galkynysh field to Afghanistan,
Pakistan and India, but despite Mirziyoyev’s promise
to “join” TAPI in 2018, the pipeline remains a “virtu-
al” project with no chance of completion in the near
future.30 
An air of reconciliation has also been observed in
Uzbekistan’s relations with Tajikistan. Te challeng-
es to Uzbekistan’s relationship with Tajikistan par-
allel those with Kyrgyzstan. Tere have traditionally
been problems with borders and water resources, but 
also ethnic minorities and radical Islam. In the early
2000s, Uzbekistan placed landmines on the undemar-
cated parts of its border with Tajikistan, allegedly to
deter terrorists afliated with the Islamic Movement of
Uzbekistan (IMU) and to obstruct the narcotics trade. 
Landmining the border was accompanied by a visa re-
gime and the destruction of the border bridge on the
Syr Darya River. Farkhod Tolipov has characterized the
state of Uzbek-Tajik relations in the late Karimov era
as a “no war no peace” situation.31 
Another long-standing source of confict with Ta-
jikistan (and to a somewhat lesser degree, Kyrgyzstan)
has been the water management issue. Tajikistan and
Kyrgyzstan are up-stream countries where the region’s
two major rivers – the Syr Darya and the Amu Darya
– originate, whereas Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and
Uzbekistan are down-stream countries. For Tajikistan
and Kyrgyzstan, developing their capacity to generate
hydropower would both secure their domestic de-
mand for energy and generate a revenue from export. 
However, building new hydroelectric energy facil-
ities would require the construction of dams, which
downstream countries have vehemently opposed for
environmental and economic reasons, especially Uz-
bekistan with its irrigation-dependent cotton produc-
tion.32 In the 2000s, Uzbekistan’s opposition to the
construction of the Rogun hydroelectric plant took
various forms and increased hostility between the two
states. Since 2010, Uzbekistan has applied a de facto
transportation blockade by hampering rail cargo into
and out of Tajikistan. As all of Tajikistan’s railways with
30 Luca Anceschi, “Turkmenistan and the virtual politics of Eurasian energy: the 
case of the TAPI pipeline project,” Central Asian Survey 36, no. 4, (2017). 
31 Farkhod Tolipov, “Uzbekistan-Tajikistan Relations: Te Long Way to Strate-
gic Partnership”, CACI Analyst, 18 September, 2018, https://www.cacianalyst. 
org/publications/analytical-articles/item/13533-uzbekistan-tajikistan-rela-
tions-the-long-way-to-strategic-partnership.html (accessed 19 October 2020). 
32 Tere is an abundance of literature on the politics of Central Asian water man-
agement. See, for example, Filippo Menga, Power and Water in Central Asia
(Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2018). On the Tajik-Uzbek issue, see Yusuf 
Makhmedov (2011) Water and energy disputes between Tajikistan and Uzbeki-
stan, and their negative infuence on regional co-operation (Oslo: NUPI, 2012). 
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the outside transit Uzbekistan, the policy had devas-
tating effects on Tajikistan’s economy. In addition,
in 2012, Uzbekistan cut of all of its gas supplies to its
neighbour, leading to a plummet in bilateral trade from
$300 million in 2008 to $2.1 million in 2014.33 
It would be no exaggeration to treat the construc-
tion of the Rogun Dam, resumed by Tajikistan one
month after Karimov’s death, as the frst test of Mir-
ziyoyev’s proclaimed good neighbourliness. Indeed,
at the time, analysts were expecting the acting presi-
dent to confront Tajik President Emomali Rahmon in
an efort to rally support among Uzbeks prior to the
election.34 Contrary to these concerns, Mirziyoyev did
not publicly voice opposition to the project and, a year
later, even endorsed the building of the dam. Since
then, cooperation has ensued in various spheres, with
disrupted rail and fight connections reopened, the visa
regime abolished, and the mutually benefcial energy
trade resurrected: in addition to Uzbekistan resuming
its gas exports to Tajikistan, the latter has since started
exporting electricity to Uzbekistan. Prior to his ofcial
visit to Tajikistan in March 2018, Mirziyoyev stated that
one has to “melt the 20-year-old ice” between one’s
neighbours even if it is “not easy”.35 Indeed, while
there has been tangible support for the praise Rahmon
and Mirziyoyev have directed towards each other for
improving the countries’ relationship, there are still
undemarcated (although already demined) parts of
the Uzbek-Tajik border as well as practical questions
regarding the Rogun project. 
Resuming bilateral energy cooperation, with Tajik-
istan providing hydropower in summer and Uzbekistan
providing gas in winter, would be economically bene-
fcial for both countries.36 Farhod Aminzhonov has ar-
gued that establishing mutual interdependence on en-
ergy trade would stabilize the countries’ relations and 
propel further cooperation in the future.37 However,
33 Edward Lemon, “Tajikistan and Uzbekistan Show More Signs of Taw”, Eura-
sianet, 27 April, 2015, https://eurasianet.org/tajikistan-and-uzbekistan-show-
more-signs-of-thaw (accessed 19 October 2020). 
34 Edward Lemon, “Signs of improving relations between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan 
but tensions remain”, CACI Analyst, 19 October, 2016, http://www.cacianalyst. 
org/publications/analytical-articles/item/13405-sings-of-improving-rela-
tions-between-uzbekistan-and-tajikistan-but-tensions-remain.html?tmpl=-
component&print=1 (accessed 19 October 2020). Yet it ought to be mentioned 
that Uzbek-Tajik relations showed signs of improvement even in the two years 
prior to Karimov’s death. Edward Lemon, “Te Transformation of the Uzbek-Ta-
jik Relationship,” Eurasia Daily Monitor 15, no. 37, 12 March, 2018, https:// 
jamestown.org/program/transformation-uzbek-tajik-relationship/ (accessed 
19 October 2020). 
35 Shavkat Mirziyoyev, quoted in “President of Uzbekistan wants to improve rela-
tions with Tajikistan”, UzDaily.com, 10 January, 2018, https://www.uzdaily.uz/ 
en/post/42288 (accessed 19 October 2020). 
36 Sam Bhutia, “Could energy trade be a win-win for Tajik-Uzbek ties?” Eurasi-
anet, 3 February, 2020,  https://eurasianet.org/could-energy-trade-be-a-win-
win-for-tajik-uzbek-ties (accessed 19 October 2020). 
37 “Will there be a new era in Tajik-Uzbek relations?” Central Asian Bureau for 
Analytical Reporting, 15 February, 2017, https://cabar.asia/en/cabar-asia-will-
there-be-a-new-era-in-tajik-uzbek-relations/# (accessed 19 October 2020). 
the countries’ past practice in applying economic pres-
sure for foreign policy purposes complicates trusting
one another enough to embrace such interdependency. 
Considering the success in improving bilateral rela-
tions with Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan, it
is not surprising that Mirziyoyev’s Uzbekistan has also
managed to fnd a common language with Kazakhstan,
the regional heavyweight. As early as spring 2017, Ka-
zakhstan’s President Nursultan Nazarbayev pointed
out the improved economic climate that had led to a
30% increase in trade turnover that he attributed to
the openness of the new leadership in Uzbekistan.38
Until the economic turnaround brought about by the
Covid-19 pandemic, the volume of bilateral trade be-
tween the two countries was growing steadily, accom-
panied by plans for joint connectivity projects like the
International Center for Trade and Economic Cooper-
ation on the border of the two countries.39 
Importantly, a thaw in Kazakh-Uzbek relations
seems to have passed its frst test. In May 2020, a dam 
at the Sardoba Reservoir, located on Uzbekistan’s
border with Kazakhstan, was destroyed, causing a
massive food in both Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Al-
though some were expecting a major diplomatic row
over who was to blame for the disaster, Tashkent and
Nur-Sultan worked in unison to resolve the crisis in
an exercise that met the criteria of “friendly and co-
operative” bilateral crisis management.40 As Anceschi 
suggests, a functional economic relationship between 
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan is of utmost importance
as it is a necessary precondition for Central Asia’s re-
gional integration.41 As long as Kazakhstan and Uzbek-
istan continue perceiving themselves as benefciaries
of enhanced economic cooperation, there is reason to 
believe that the trend of increasing bilateral turnout
will continue despite economic challenges generated
by the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic. 
Finally, in the south, Uzbekistan shares a 144 km-
long border with Afghanistan along the River Amu Dar-
ya. Yet it is slightly surprising that Tashkent’s policy
of “good neighbourliness” also extends to the south,
38 Catherine Putz, “Brothers Again: Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan,” Te Diplomat, 
24 March, 2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/03/brothers-again-uzbeki-
stan-and-kazakhstan/ (accessed 19 October 2020). 
39 Aigul’ Ibrayeva, “Kakiye torgovye otnosheniya svyazyvayut Kazakhstan i Uz-
bekistan” [“What trade relations exist between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan?”], 
Kursiv.kz, 28 April, 2020, https://kursiv.kz/news/ekonomika/2020-04/kak-
ie-torgovye-otnosheniya-svyazyvayut-kazakhstan-i-uzbekistan (accessed 19 
October 2020). 
40 Farkhod Tolipov, “Border problems in Central Asia: dividing incidents, uniting 
solution”, Times of Central Asia, 15 July, 2020, https://www.timesca.com/in-
dex.php/news/26-opinion-head/22733-border-problems-in-central-asia-di-
viding-incidents-uniting-solution (accessed 19 October 2020). 
41 See also Luca Anceschi, “Te Resurgence of Central Asian Connectivity,” Te 
Diplomat Magazine 37, December 2017. 
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considering that Central Asia typically refers exclu-
sively to the fve former Soviet republics (Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbeki-
stan). In fact, the explicit inclusion of Afghanistan in
Uzbekistan’s Central Asia policy can be seen as one of
the novelties of the Mirziyoyev-era foreign policy. In
June 2020, Uzbek Foreign Minister Abdulaziz Kamilov 
called Afghanistan an inseparable part of Central Asia, 
confrming Asiryan’s argument according to which the
attempt to “co-opt Afghanistan into Central Asia” has 
become a top priority for the Mirziyoyev government.42 
Similarly to Uzbekistan’s bilateral engagements
with its other neighbours, enhanced economic coop-
eration is the means and the aim of good neighbour-
liness with Afghanistan. In December 2017, President
of Afghanistan Mohammad Ashraf Ghani paid an of-
cial visit to Mirziyoyev in Uzbekistan. It was the frst
such high-level meeting in 16 years and resulted in
signing agreements worth $500 million in trade and
connectivity collaboration.43 In summer 2019, pro-
spective bilateral projects ranged from car manufac-
turing and textile production to transit and electricity
infrastructure.44 If these projects are completed to the
beneft of both parties, it will mark an important shift 
in Uzbekistan’s policy towards Afghanistan, which has
traditionally sufered from a discrepancy between lofty
promises and limited deeds.45 However, since trans-
portation via Afghanistan would become the shortest
route from Uzbekistan to the sea, Tashkent has a vested
interest in ensuring that the necessary transit infra-
structure is indeed built and remains in operation. 
Investing in Afghanistan creates a situation in
which Uzbekistan has a stake in the country’s peace
process. Indeed, Uzbekistan’s policy of good neigh-
bourliness in Afghanistan comes with a persuasive of-
fer to support peace-building in the country. Speaking
in 2018, Mirziyoyev explicitly stated the rationale for
Uzbekistan’s involvement in the resolution of the war 
in Afghanistan: “A secure Afghanistan means a secure 
Uzbekistan; it is a guarantee of a prosperous and stable
42 Aleksey Aseryan, “New Faces, Old Patterns in Uzbekistan’s Foreign Policy”, 
Te Diplomat, 21 August, 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/08/new-fac-
es-old-patterns-in-uzbekistans-foreign-policy/ (accessed 19 October 2020). 
43 Yuriy Sarukhanyan, “Afghan Traditions of the Uzbek Foreign Policy,” Central 
Asian Bureau for Analytical Reporting, 1 July, 2019, https://cabar.asia/en/af-
ghan-traditions-of-the-uzbek-foreign-policy/ (accessed 19 October 2020). 
44 Umida Hashimova, “Uzbekistan Focused on Developing Trade with Afghani-
stan”, Te Diplomat, 29 July, 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/07/uzbek-
istan-focused-on-developing-trade-with-afghanistan/ (accessed 19 October 
2020). 
45 Joakim Brattvoll, “Uzbekistan’s ambiguous policies on Afghanistan,” PRIO Poli-
cy Brief, no. 1, (2016). 
South and Central Asia”.46 Tashkent has relentlessly
pursued talks with both Ghani’s government and the
Taliban, and positioned itself as the reliable mediator
in the process. 
IMPLICATIONS OF UZBEKISTAN’S GOOD
NEIGHBOURLINESS FOR CENTRAL ASIA 
As the previous section highlights, the contemporary
Uzbek foreign policy of “good neighbourliness” is ex-
ercised in bilateral terms with all states with which
Tashkent shares a border. Te reliance on bilateral co-
operation and connectivity projects that yield tangi-
ble economic gains for all parties marks a shift away
from the earlier Central Asian multilateral initiatives.
Previously, Anceschi argues, Central Asian integration
projects were “pursuing chaotic connectivity agendas
through vaguely defned policy steps”47 and did not re-
sult in sustainable regional co-operation. Uzbekistan’s
re-establishing and strengthening bilateral relations
does not automatically lead to regionalism per se, but
this process is the necessary frst step to any lasting
collaboration in the future. 
Although Mirziyoyev’s foreign policy approach to
his country’s neighbours has been mostly bilateral,
there is also one multilateral initiative that deserves
a mention. In 2018, a Central Asian regional summit,
attended exclusively by Central Asian leaders, was
organized for the first time in a decade and attend-
ed by all but Turkmen President Gurbanguly Berdy-
mukhammedov. A year later, a follow-up summit
was hosted by Tashkent and attended by all fve pres-
idents. Although both summits fell short of delivering 
any concrete results on how to resolve the region’s
long-standing issues, the heads of state still agreed
to arrange such meetings annually.48 Some promi-
nent analysts heralded the 2019 summit as a genuine
turning point in Central Asian regionalism, with S.
Frederick Starr calling it “Central Asia’s ASEAN mo-
ment”49 and Arkadiy Dubnov seeing a breakthrough
in the attending leaders’ readiness to discuss thorny
46 Shavkat Mirziyoyev, quoted in Umida Hashimova, “What is Uzbekistan’s Role in 
the Afghan Peace Process?” Te Diplomat, 11 March, 2019, https://thediplomat. 
com/2019/03/what-is-uzbekistans-role-in-the-afghan-peace-process/ (ac-
cessed 19 October 2020). 
47 Anceschi, “Te Resurgence of Central Asian Connectivity”. 
48 Te 2020 summit was to be held in Kyrgyzstan in August but has since been post-
poned due to the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic. 
49 R. Frederick Starr, “Is Tis Central Asia’s ASEAN Moment?”, Te Diplomat, 5 De-
cember, 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/12/is-this-central-asias-asean-
moment/ (accessed 19 October 2020). 
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matters in a friendly and constructive matter.50 In con-
trast, Fozil Mashrab argues that the summit format is
unlikely to develop into an institutionalized regional
structure, while agreeing that the summits could serve
a purpose in enhancing understanding among the fve
Central Asian heads of state and thus boost intra-re-
gional trade.51 It is only logical that Uzbekistan’s new 
policy on Central Asia prioritizes bilateral and mutually
benefcial trade and infrastructure projects, consid-
ering Central Asia’s track record of failed regionalist
initiatives as well as the mainstream assumption that
successful regionalist structures are built on pre-ex-
isting trade cooperation. 
While Uzbekistan has confrmed its commitment
to the policy of good neighbourliness during the on-
going Covid-19 pandemic, attempts to design a re-
gion-wide coordinated efort in combatting the spread
of the virus have fallen short. All Central Asian states
in unison closed their borders with their neighbours,
and the lack of coordination led to the disruption of
cross-border trade.52 Moreover, national governments
had very diferent views regarding the spread of the
virus, ranging from the ofcial zero cases in Turkmen-
istan to tens of thousands of alleged cases in Kazakh-
stan. In essence, a coordinated region-wide response
would have been nothing short of a miracle given the
lack of an institutional framework for responding to a 
global health crisis combined with doubts about the
accuracy of ofcial statistics. 
Yet it is important to note that none of the Central
Asian states, including Uzbekistan, have completely
shut themselves off during the crisis, and nor have
there been any serious conficts between states since
the start of the pandemic. While Paul Stronski argues
that Mirziyoyev has “shown leadership in coordinat-
ing his government’s response to the crisis with oth-
er Central Asian leaders”,53 available evidence of this
collaboration is limited to the frequent phone calls
between the President of Uzbekistan and his fellow
heads of state as well as voicing potential ways of
50 Arkadiy Dubnov, “Sammit bez Rossii. Smozhet li Tashkent ob”yedinit’ Tsen-
tral’nuyu Aziyu?” [“Summit without Russia. Can Uzbekistan unite Central 
Asia?”] Carnegie Moscow Center, 4 December, 2019, https://carnegie.ru/com-
mentary/80469 (accessed 19 October 2020). 
51 Fozil Mashrab, “Uzbekistan Hosts Second Central Asian Consultative Summit”, 
Eurasia Daily Monitor 16, no. 174, 13 December, 2019, https://jamestown.org/ 
program/uzbekistan-hosts-second-central-asian-consultative-summit/ (ac-
cessed 19 October 2020). 
52 “COVID-19 crisis response in Central Asia”, OECD, 4 June, 2020, https://www. 
oecd.org/coronavirus/policy-responses/covid-19-crisis-response-in-central-
asia-5305f172/ (accessed 19 October 2020). 
53 Paul Stronski, “Coronavirus in the Caucasus and Central Asia”, Carnegie, 8 July, 
2020, https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/07/08/coronavirus-in-cauca-
sus-and-central-asia-pub-81898 (accessed 19 October 2020). 
coordinating within the Turkic Council.54 Utilizing
the Turkic Council to promote a multilateral approach
to good neighbourliness might be efcient given that
Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan are full members and
Turkmenistan, while not a member, is still involved in
the activities of the organization. 
THE NEIGHBOURS BEYOND: UZBEKISTAN
BETWEEN THE BIG NON-REGIONAL ACTORS 
President Mirziyoyev’s modest reform agenda and his 
efforts to foster “good neighbourliness” have been
viewed favourably by the big non-regional actors. Al-
though Uzbekistan has also demonstrated an interest
in enhancing cooperation with the United States and
the EU, it is the relations with the two major actors,
Russia and China, that matter the most. China and
Russia are Uzbekistan’s biggest trade partners and
sources of FDI,55 and their role has only become more 
prominent since Uzbekistan’s foreign policy opening. 
As a legacy of the Karimov-era policy of isolation, Uz-
bekistan is currently a member of the Shanghai Coop-
eration Organisation and the Turkic Council, but does 
not belong to other integration organizations. 
Russia has been courting Tashkent ever since Mir-
ziyoyev took ofce as it knows that the Uzbek Presi-
dent’s reform agenda depends on successfully attract-
ing foreign investment to support the economy.56 Mos-
cow would like to see Uzbekistan join the EAEU as well
as the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO),
a military alliance Uzbekistan left in 2012, but up to
now these hopes have not materialized. Speaking in
2017, Uzbek Foreign Minister Abdulaziz Kamilov stat-
ed that the question of renewing Uzbekistan’s CSTO
membership was not on the agenda, and nor were
there any plans to discuss or review this matter in the 
future.57 Meanwhile, the question of EAEU member-
ship has been resolved with Tashkent opting for an
observer status that comes with no expectations or
54 “President of Uzbekistan takes part in extraordinary summit of the Turkic Coun-
cil”, PV.uz, 10 April, 2020, https://www.pv.uz/en/news/president-of-uzbeki-
stan-takes-part-in-extraordinary-summit-of-the-turkic-council (accessed 19 
October 2020). 
55 In addition to China and Russia, Switzerland is also an important trade partner, 
mainly as a market for Uzbekistan’s considerable gold exports. OECD, “Uzbek-
istan’s sustainable infrastructure investments”, Sustainable Infrastructure for 
Low-Carbon Development in Central Asia and the Caucasus: Hotspot Analysis 
and Needs Assessment (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2019). 
56 Paul Stronski & Michal Sokolsky, “Multipolarity in Practice: Understanding 
Russia’s Engagement With Regional Institutions,” Carnegie, 8 January, 2020, 
https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/01/08/multipolarity-in-practice-un-
derstanding-russia-s-engagement-with-regional-institutions-pub-80717 (ac-
cessed 19 October 2020). 
57 Abdulaziz Kamilov, quoted in “Uzbekistan says won’t rejoin Russia-led secu-
rity bloc”, Reuters, 5 July, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-uzbeki-
stan-russia-bloc-idUSKBN19Q2DL (accessed 19 October 2020). 



























































FIIA WORKING PAPER I 
obligations of future membership. As long as Uzbeki-
stan remains excluded from these two Russia-led Cen-
tral Asia integration projects, they will lack the stra-
tegic weight Uzbekistan’s potential accession would
provide, taking into account its growing importance
in the region. 
Meanwhile, however, Russia has welcomed Mirzi-
yoyev’s new policy of regional opening. In the security
sphere, Moscow shares Tashkent’s interest in avoiding
the destabilization in Afghanistan that could potential-
ly spread in its direction, and has thus welcomed Uz-
bekistan’s eforts to mediate peace between the Taliban
and the Ghani government.58 In addition, the thaw in 
Uzbek-Tajik relations alleviates Moscow’s concerns
related to intra-regional security given Russia’s close
relations with Tajikistan. Meanwhile, in order for Rus-
sia’s billion dollar investments in Uzbekistan, such as
the $11 billion nuclear power plant project,59 to be
beneficial for Russia not only in political but also in
economic terms, Mirziyoyev must honour promises to
improve cross-border trade and infrastructure linkag-
es to China and South Asia. 
In turn, China is also welcoming towards Uzbek-
istan’s rise to regional prominence. Uzbekistan has
been among the most ardent supporters of the Belt and
Road Initiative (BRI), and due to its strategic location at
the centre of Central Asia, China can reap both direct
and indirect benefts from Uzbekistan’s involvement
with the BRI.60 As Ikboljon Qoraboyev notes, the BRI
as “a framework for realizing investments and capac-
ity-building transfers in the sphere of infrastructure” 
resonates well with Uzbekistan’s agenda of moderni-
zation and its foreign policy priorities.61 In Uzbekistan,
public sentiments towards China are more favourable 
than in those Central Asian states that border China,
which gives Mirziyoyev’s government more leverage
in developing its relations with Beijing. Finally, from
China’s perspective, pushing for deeper trade and in-
frastructure integration in Central Asia, as implied by 
the overland Silk Road Economic Belt and minimiz-
ing disruptions of cross-border trade, is simplifed by 
functional relations existing between Central Asian
states. 
58 Stefan Hedlund, “Uzbekistan emerging from isolation,” GIS Report, 15 February, 
2019, https://www.gisreportsonline.com/uzbekistan-emerging-from-isola-
tion,politics,2801.html (accessed 20 October 2020). 
59 Ibid. 
60 Indra Overland & Roman Vakulchuk, “China’s Belt and Road Gets a Central Asian 
Boost,” Te Diplomat, 3 May, 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/05/chinas-
belt-and-road-gets-a-central-asian-boost/ (accessed 20 October 2020). 
61 Ikboljon Qoraboyev, “Te Belt and Road Initiative and Uzbekistan’s New Strategy 
of Development: Sustainability of mutual relevance and positive dynamics,” Uz-
bek Journal of Legal Studies, no. 2, 2018. 
The West, for its part, has been equally positive
about Mirziyoyev’s reformist outlook and the policy
of “good neighbourliness”. Uzbekistan’s balancing
act between Moscow and Beijing, and its eagerness in
building Central Asian regionalism on intra-region-
al trade while including Afghanistan in the process,
pleases both Washington and Brussels, as they aspire
to see Central Asia as prosperous, stable, and geopo-
litically autonomous from both China and Russia.62
Both the US and the EU envision that Afghanistan’s
further integration into the Central Asian region, de-
fned in the United States’ Silk Road Initiative of 2011
as “resuming traditional trading routes and recon-
structing significant infrastructure links broken by
decades of confict”,63 will support peace and stability
in the country. In the EU’s new strategy for Central
Asia, Afghanistan has been included in projects and
programmes in the spheres of cross-border trade, ed-
ucation, and civil society. 
The West also supports Uzbekistan’s current ef-
forts to enter the WTO. To provide tangible support for
Uzbekistan’s reforms, the European Bank for Recon-
struction and Development (EBRD) opened a new Res-
ident Ofce in Tashkent in autumn 2018. Earlier that
year, the EU and Uzbekistan launched negotiations for
an Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement
that would presumably enable cooperation in the in-
terests of both parties. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Tashkent’s new policy of “good neighbourliness” has
begun the process of normalizing Uzbekistan’s re-
lations with its regional neighbours. By embracing
“connectivity by default”,64 Uzbekistan’s President
Shavkat Mirziyoyev has put an end to Uzbekistan’s
former isolationist policy in order to reap economic
gains by capitalizing on Uzbekistan’s central location
at the crossroads of Eurasian trade routes. Despite its
bilateral outlook, the policy of “good neighbourliness”
has the potential to transform the political, economic
and social dynamics within the Central Asian region.
62 Charles Sullivan, “Uzbekistan and the United States: Interests and avenues for 
cooperation,” Asian Afairs 50, no. 1, (2019); Georgi Gotev, “EU-sponsored 
Nur-Sultan conference ‘happily coincides’ with Central Asia summit,” Eu-
ractiv, 20 November, 2019, https://www.euractiv.com/section/central-asia/ 
news/eu-sponsored-nur-sultan-conference-happily-coincides-with-cen-
tral-asia-summit/ (accessed 20 October 2020). 
63 “U.S. Support for the New Silk Road,” State Department (2015), 
https://2009-2017.state.gov/p/sca/ci/af/newsilkroad/index.htm (accessed 20 
October 2020). 
64 Anceschi, “Te Resurgence of Central Asian Connectivity”. 
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While continuing to opt out of political regional organi-
zations led by region outsiders, Uzbekistan is laying the
groundwork for sustainable Central Asian co-opera-
tion from within in a manner that is acceptable to the
Central Asian states and big non-regional actors alike. 
One of the major implications of Mirziyoyev’s pol-
icy of “good neighbourliness” is the improvement in
Uzbekistan’s reputation in the global arena, which
may in part contribute to a positive assessment of Uz-
bekistan as a target for foreign investment. The fact
that Uzbekistan was named one of the top 20 “global
improvers” in the World Bank’s 2020 Doing Business
report, and 2019 Country of the Year by Te Econo-
mist, is an important legitimizer of the Mirziyoyev
government both at home and abroad. Combined with
the array of other measures of liberalization, particu-
larly in the sphere of business and fnance, the regional
thaw is enabling and consolidating Mirziyoyev’s pro-
ject of authoritarian modernization in Uzbekistan. 
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